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Abstract 
Controlling COVID-19 transmission in universities poses challenges due to the complex social 
networks and potential for asymptomatic spread. We developed a stochastic transmission model based 
on realistic mixing patterns and evaluated alternative mitigation strategies. We predict, for plausible 
model parameters, that if asymptomatic cases are half as infectious as symptomatic cases, then 20% 
(98% Prediction Interval: 7% – 42%) of students could be infected during the first term without 
additional control measures. First year students are the main drivers of transmission with the highest 
infection rates, largely due to communal residences. In isolation, reducing face-to-face teaching is the 
most effective intervention considered, however layering multiple interventions could reduce 
infection rates by 75%. Fortnightly or more frequent mass testing is required to impact transmission 
and was not the most effective option considered. Our findings suggest that additional outbreak 
control measures should be considered for university settings.  
 
Introduction 
Despite the on-going COVID-19 epidemic, social distancing measures in many countries were 
beginning to be relaxed and universities across the world re-opened for the new academic term in 
September 2020. In the UK, there are 2.3 million students, with up to 40,000 undergraduates at a 
single institution1. Universities are integral to many towns and cities in the UK: for example, in the 
2011 census, a quarter of Oxford’s adult population was registered as a full-time student. Managing 
universities is a complex operation, and in the context of the COVID-19 epidemic, re-opening 
universities poses particular challenges for containing disease transmission.   
 
Since June 2020, the UK has moved from a national containment strategy to localised containment of 
outbreaks, with the number of cases highly variable across the country. The imposition of lockdown 
in March 2020 led to a substantial reduction in travel and mobility, and local lockdowns have led to 
further reduced movement in some parts of the country. In the UK, re-opening universities is 
associated with a mass travel event. Around 80% of students leave home to attend University, moving 
an average 90 miles2. This synchronised event will increase population mixing at a national scale with 
the potential to spark outbreaks in new areas if not carefully managed. Once the university term starts 
there are more unique challenges facing universities. Students, in common with other 20-to-30-year 
olds, report high numbers of social contacts in their everyday lives3. Student accommodation 
frequently involves communal living, either in halls of residence that house several hundred students, 
or in all-student households renting in the private sector. Regular face-to-face teaching can involve 
several hundred students in a lecture theatre, and even without large lectures, tutorials and small 
group teaching involve close and prolonged contact between individuals.    
 
The potentially high rate of transmission within a university setting is unlikely to translate to high 
morbidity among students. There is a marked age disparity in severe COVID-19 cases, with younger 
people less likely to exhibit typical symptoms or suffer severe outcomes4. In the UK, less than 0.2% 
of COVID-19-related deaths are in persons under 30. Students are typically young adults in their early 
twenties. Nevertheless, young adults are susceptible to infection and infectious to others. Hence there 
is a risk of transmission within the student population, posing a risk to vulnerable students, people 
outside the university setting and family members when students return home.  
 
A number of studies have investigated the challenges inherent in reopening of universities amidst the 
COVID-19 pandemic5–9. Existing models have mainly focused on isolated campus universities in the 
US, rather than civic universities that are common in the UK and elsewhere6,9, and the majority have 
not had access to realistic mixing patterns within the university setting, which drive transmission. In 
this paper we combined analysis of social contact data with a data-driven mathematical modelling 
approach to investigate the impact of re-opening a UK university on COVID-19 transmission. We 
characterise patterns of disease transmission and investigate potential mitigating effects of 
interventions. These results are used to synthesise guidance on measures that universities might wish 




The Social Contact Survey included 363 participants whose listed occupation included “STUDENT”. 
Students reported more home contacts than other participants (3.5 versus 2.3, p-value < 0.001).  
However, although students reported more contacts than other participants on average, there was no 
evidence of a systematic difference (29.9 versus 26.8, p-value 0.40). The majority (82% 95% CI: 79% 
to 86%) of students’ social contacts are either home or associated with university. On average, 
students reported 20.0 (95% CI: 14.1, 28.8) university contacts, and 4.3 (95% CI: 2.7, 6.5) 
other/leisure contacts.  
 
To capture student contact patterns within a university, we used comprehensive anonymised student 
accommodation data for the academic year 2019/2020 from UoB. The data included 20,819 registered 
undergraduates and 8,501 registered postgraduates divided into 6 faculties and 28 schools and 2,862 
unique postcodes (see supplementary table 1 for number of students by year of study and faculty). 
Most students (92%) are under 30 years of age and the largest school is the School of Economics, 
Finance and Management with 3,674 students.  
 
We used the student data to create synthetic contact matrices for mixing between year groups and 
schools. From postcodes we generated between school household contact matrices for each year of 
study, and for all years (figure 1). Halls of residence dominate the first-year contact matrix, with 
mixing across all schools and no clear assortative mixing (figure 1a).  
 
In years 2 and 3 the average household size decreases substantially and there is increased assortativity 
mixing between schools, indicating that students are more likely to share accommodation with 
someone from their own school by choice (figures 1b & 1c).  
  
The university-wide contact matrix consists of 161 groups of students categorised by 28 schools and 
nine year-groups (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, PGT (taught postgraduates), PGR (research postgraduates)) 
(figure 1d). The higher level of mixing between first years is evident in the lower left-hand corner and 
the assortative mixing by year and school is shown by the diagonal. There are fewer inter-year 
household contacts and more intra-university mixing between taught postgraduates than for research 
postgraduates.  
 
We investigated the dynamics of an epidemic in the student population using a stochastic 
compartmental model with plausible COVID-19 parameter values (figure 2). Because of the 
population structure, the stochasticity and relatively small numbers involved, there is large intrinsic 
variability between simulations with identical parameter values; we report the mean and 98% 
prediction interval.  
 
Using plausible parameters (asymptomatic cases half as infectious as symptomatic cases and a 
reproduction number of 𝑅𝑈 = 2.7), and without interventions or holidays, we predict a university-
wide outbreak with an early growth rate of 0.07 (98%PI: 0.03-0.10), which is equivalent to a doubling 
time of 9 days (98%PI: 7-24 days) (figure 3a). Based on the timescales of COVID-19 with baseline 
parameters, we expect that it would take around 4 months for the outbreak to peak, assuming no 
winter break.  
 
First year students drive the early part of the outbreak and experience the highest burden of infection, 
followed by second and third years and taught postgraduate students (figure 3b). Students in year 4 
and above and research postgraduates have the lowest infection rates. 
 
By the end of the first term, under the baseline model 4200 (98%P.I.: 1800 – 9800) out of ~28000 
students, or 15% (98%P.I.: 6% – 35%), have been infected. On the last day of term 54 (98%P.I.: 15 – 
140) symptomatic cases and 640 (98%P.I.: 200 – 1600) asymptomatic cases are still infectious. On 
average, there are between 13 and 15 asymptomatic cases for every one symptomatic case. The 
number of cases doubles every 7 to 22 days. Without additional control measures, 68% (98%P.I.: 
44% – 83%) of students would be infected by the end of the academic year. The low rate of symptoms 
and low morbidity rate results in a median of zero deaths in the student population. 
 
The relative infectiousness of asymptomatic cases is central for determining the scale of a university-
based outbreak. In our framework, asymptomatic cases are either less or as infectious as symptomatic 
cases, however because asymptomatic cases do not self-isolate without a test, for higher values of 
relative infectiousness, , asymptomatic cases produce on average more secondary cases than 
symptomatic cases (see SI figure S3). For lower values of  university-focussed outbreaks are largely 
driven by the forcing from outside the university. For intermediate values, outbreaks peak after the 
first term. For high values, outbreaks peak before the end of the first term (figures S4 and S5) 
 
As a comparison to the baseline case, if asymptomatic cases are 30% as infectious as symptomatic 
cases (𝑅𝑈 = 2.25) then we expect an early growth rate of 0.06 (98%P.I.: 0.04 – 0.09) and a doubling 
time of 12 days (98%P.I.: 8 – 17 days). Without additional control measures, 36% (98%P.I.: 12% – 
57%) of students would be infected by the end of the academic year. The epidemic profiles for the full 
98%P.I. of potential scenarios for asymptomatic infectiousness, which corresponds to reproduction 
numbers from 1.7 to 3.4 are shown in supplementary figure S5. 
 
We investigated multiple interventions that reduced the infection burden in the student population 
(figures 3c – f). The impact of implementing each intervention was explored in isolation and in 
combination with other measures. When layering interventions, we implemented lower cost 
interventions first, such as creating COVID-secure interactions with face coverings and 
social/physical distancing, and reserved mass testing of non-symptomatic students as a more resource-
intensive intervention.   
 
For realistic values of COVID security and 𝑅𝑈 = 2.7, we find that reducing the transmission 
probability with COVID secure interactions has the potential to reduce, but not completely eliminate, 
the size of outbreaks (figure 3c). We estimate that by reducing transmission for non-household 
contacts by 25% the early doubling time is increased to between 7 to 20 days. The percentage of 
students infected by the end of the first term is 9% (98%P.I.: 4% – 28%) and the number of 
symptomatic and asymptomatic students infectious on the last day of term is decreased to 30 
(98%P.I.: 11 – 120) and 360 (98%P.I.: 120 – 1300) respectively. Reducing transmission for non-
household contacts by 50% increases the doubling time to 13 (98%P.I.: 7 - 36) days and further 
reduces the number of infectious students on the last day of term 16 (98%P.I.: 2 – 57) symptomatic 
cases and 188 (98%P.I.: 59 – 650) asymptomatic cases. 
Reducing the number of interactions made during face-to-face teaching from 20 to 15 other students 
increases the early doubling time to 11 (98%P.I.: 7 - 20) days and reduces the number of infected 
students at the end of the first term to 33 (98%P.I.: 10 – 110) symptomatic cases and 403 (98%P.I.: 
120 – 1200) asymptomatic cases (figure 3d). Reducing the number of face-to-face contacts from 20 to 
5 other students was the single most impactful intervention investigated in terms of the number of 
students infected by the end of the first term and the number of infectious students on the last day of 
term, increasing doubling time to 16 (98%P.I.: 9 - 110) days, including scenarios in which the number 
of cases in the student population was driven to zero (figure 3d). The number of infected students at 
the end of the first term was 11 (98%P.I.: 2 – 32) symptomatic cases and 140 (98%P.I.: 54 – 330) 
asymptomatic cases. 
 
Implemented without other measures, reducing the size of living circles (defined as the number of 
students that share bathroom/kitchen facilities) from 24 to 20 or 14 students was overall the least 
effective intervention investigated (figure 3e, supplementary Table 2). However, when implemented 
on top of COVID secure interactions and reductions in face-to-face teaching, reducing living circles 
to 14 individuals does reduce the total percentage of students that are infected by the end of the first 
term by 25%. 
 
Mass testing all students regardless of symptoms was effective at reducing the total number of 
infections and the initial rate of epidemic growth rate, but reactive testing was required for the whole 
year (figure 3f). Compared to other interventions, mass testing was generally more effective for 
higher values of the reproduction number and resulted in the third lowest number of infected students 
by the end of the first term. However, for lower values of asymptomatic infectiousness, and hence 
lower values of the reproduction number, reducing face-to-face teaching, implementing COVID 
security and reduced living circles was more effective than testing all students (figure 3g). 
 
Testing all students every 2 days primarily reduced the number of students with asymptomatic and 
pre-symptomatic infections, reducing the ratio of asymptomatic to symptomatic cases to 9:1 to 11:1. 
However, the reduction in infection from mass testing comes at a substantial cost in terms of the 
number of students self- isolating: under 2 day testing, at the height of the outbreak 1,300 (860-1,500) 
students (4.5%, 3% – 5%) were self-isolating compared to 520 (98%P.I.: 470 – 560) students (1.9%, 
1.7% – 2.0%) in the baseline scenario. 
 
Testing all students monthly had a minimal impact compared to not testing at all, reducing the 
average percentage of students infected during the outbreak by 1.3%. Increasing testing frequency to 
fortnightly, weekly or every 3 or 2 days was beneficial, and this was robust to parameter choice 
(supplementary figure S5). 
 
We found that implementing multiple, layered interventions was able to effectively control 
transmission in the student population (figure 4a-c). The remaining cases in students were largely due 
to importation of infection from outside the university setting: reducing the background rate of 
infection demonstrates that if imported infections could be managed then the number of infected 
students could be very low.   
 
Discussion 
Our results suggest that, under normal circumstances, COVID-19 would spread readily in a university 
setting. Our data-driven approach reveals natural heterogeneities in student mixing patterns that can 
be exploited to enhance disease control. We find that controlling transmission is possible with 
combinations of social distancing, online teaching, self-isolation, and potentially mass testing of 
students without symptoms.  
 
Our findings highlight the importance of monitoring first year students and halls of residence in 
particular. In our analysis, first year students experienced the highest rates of infection and dominate 
the early part of the outbreak due to the high levels of mixing in halls of residence. Since we first 
conducted this work in May 2020, a cross-sectional serosurvey of students in five English universities 
found that first year undergraduates were three times more likely to be seropositive than other year 
groups and that seropositivity was 49% in students living in halls of residence in universities with 
high SARS-CoV-2 infection rates10. Halls of residence have been identified as a risk factor for the 
transmission of other close contact infections including meningitis11, mumps12, norovirus13, 
respiratory illnesses14 and gastroenteritis15. In practice, students in larger residences are allocated into 
shared flats or living circles, potentially limiting widespread transmission. Limiting transmission 
within residences is paramount for COVID-19 control in university settings.  
 
Lessons about infection control in universities can be learnt from other diseases. Mass vaccination 
used for meningitis, mumps and rubella outbreaks was not an option for COVID-19 in early 2020. 
During a mumps outbreak in a university hall of residence, Kay et al (2011) reported difficulty in 
identifying higher risk students12. Due to the high number of contacts and of students’ contact 
networks inhabit, universities may wish to consider how they might facilitate the collation of data to 
expedite the contact tracing process. Embedding positive health behaviours like hand washing and 
using face coverings will also contribute to minimising transmission opportunities. A randomised 
control trial of hand washing in university residences found that installing alcohol hand sanitizer in 
every room, bathroom and dining hall reduced respiratory illness in students by 20%14.  
 
Previous modelling work, based on universities in the United States, has focussed on the necessity of 
regularly testing all students5. While our findings are consistent that frequent testing is necessary if 
used in isolation, our modelling approach demonstrates that other interventions are viable. This is 
partly due to our result that suggests that the reproduction number would be lower than previous 
studies have assumed due to the high proportion of asymptomatic cases. Furthermore, as previous 
studies have discussed5, when prevalence is low, high testing burden can lead to unnecessary isolation 
of negative cases. We tried to mitigate test burden by implementing reactive mass testing once 
incidence increased. Antibody testing could also play in role in determining prior infection and 
infection rates in student populations.  
 
Our work uses a similar compartmental modelling approach to the handful of models that have been 
developed for COVID-19 transmission in universities in the USA. A drawback of this approach is that 
individual behaviour is not readily captured; in particular, our approach does not capture 
superspreaders and contact tracing and isolation of contacts or living circles is difficult to include in 
detail. We capture some heterogeneity using household and faculty mixing data, and a stochastic 
model was necessary due to the potentially small number of students in each subgroup. Nevertheless, 
a network modelling approach would be more appropriate for studying superspreading events and 
individual-level variation.  
 
Furthermore, while we had detailed data pertaining to the university student population, we had 
limited data on contact with the location population and we did not include university staff explicitly 
in the model. Given the age distribution of students, and the high likelihood of asymptomatic 
infection, staff and surrounding communities are likely to experience higher levels of morbidity than 
the students themselves. Although by-and-large students fraternise with students, they do pose some 
risk to more vulnerable groups within the university such as staff with co-morbidities, or to their local 
community. Reliable data on staff student interactions was not available and should be included in a 
future study. Safeguarding all is a high priority.  
 
The aim of this work was to characterise potential COVID-19 transmission patterns in a university 
setting and identify strategies that may prove more likely to control transmission. This work was 
provided to the Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling (SPI-M) which provides 
modelling evidence to the UK government 16 and used directly to inform planning for re-opening at 
the University of Bristol. In the absence of university outbreak data, we used COVID-19 transmission 
parameters estimated from other settings. Once the university year starts, and should there be an 
outbreak, this type of modelling should be used to estimate parameters in real time and provide a 
more accurate tool for guiding interventions.  
Methods 
The SCS was a paper-based and online survey of 5,388 unique participants in Great Britain conducted 
in 20103,17. We have previously used these data to estimate the reproduction number for COVID-1918 
The SCS included 363 participants whose listed occupation included “STUDENT”. We extracted 
these participants to summarise their contacts by context (home, university, leisure/other, travel) and 
to estimate the potential COVID-19 reproduction number in students. We used a Student’s t-test to 
determine the level of evidence for the observed differences in numbers of contacts between students 
and the general population.    
 
We used the SCS to estimate the contact rate between students by year and school. For a student in 
school/year group 𝑖, we assumed that all study contacts were within the same group, i.e. 𝑠𝑖𝑖 = ?̅? and 
𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 0, where ?̅? is the mean number of university-associated contacts reported by students in the 
SCS. We assumed that non-study contacts occurred across the whole university. We took 𝑟𝑖𝑗 =
?̅? 𝑛𝑗 𝑁⁄ , where ?̅?  is the mean number of other/leisure contacts reported by students in the SCS and 
𝑛𝑗 𝑁⁄  is the proportion of students in group 𝑗.  
 
We were provided with an anonymised extract of student data for a university relating to the 




The data contained age, primary faculty affiliation (7 faculties), primary school affiliation (28 
schools), year of study (6 undergraduate years, taught postgraduates and research postgraduates), 
term-time residence, home region (if in the UK), and country of origin for students registered in 
2019/2020.    
 
We used the university data to group students by school affiliation and year group – a total of 161 
categories. We then estimate the household contact rate between students in each school/year group. 
We estimated the number of household contacts from the student data, taking postcode as a proxy for 
household. The average number of students in school/year group 𝑗 sharing accommodation with a 









where 𝑛𝑖𝑘 is the number of students in school/year 𝑖 living at unique postcode 𝑘 and 𝑃 is the number 
of unique postcodes.  
 
In UoB, students in university residences will be assigned to a living circle, which is a group of 
students that have higher rates of contact. We take the baseline living circle size as 24 students and 
investigate the impact of smaller living circles. Where the number of students at a single postcode 
exceeded the living circle size, we create subunits within the postcode that are the size of the living 
circle. Each living circle contains a random sample of students at that address. See supplementary 
figure S1 for a pictorial explanation of how the data are processed. 
 
We use a stochastic compartmental model to simulate transmission dynamics in the student 
population at UoB. We assumed that COVID-19 could be captured by seven infection states: 
susceptible to infection (S), latently infected (E), asymptomatic and infectious (A), pre-symptomatic 
and infectious (P), symptomatic and infectious (I), self-isolating (Q), hospitalised (H) and recovered 
and immune (R) with the subscript 𝑖 indicating the subgroup. The total number of students is given by 








𝑆𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑆𝑖(𝑡) − Δ𝑆𝐸 
 
(1) 
𝐸𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝐸𝑖(𝑡) + Δ𝑆𝐸 − Δ𝐸 
 
𝐴𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝐴𝑖(𝑡) + Δ𝐸𝐴 − Δ𝐴 
 
𝑃𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) + Δ𝐸 − Δ𝐸𝐴 − Δ𝑃 
 
𝐼𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝐼𝑖(𝑡) +  Δ𝑃𝐼 − Δ𝐼 
 
𝑅𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + Δ𝐴𝑅 + Δ𝐼𝑅 + Δ𝑄𝑅  
 
𝑄𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑄𝑖(𝑡) + Δ𝐴 − Δ𝐴𝑅 +  Δ𝐼 − Δ𝐼𝑅 + Δ𝑃 − Δ𝑃𝐼 − Δ𝑄𝑅 
 
 
The transitions are given by:  






Δ𝐸~ 𝐵𝑖𝑛(𝐸𝑖 , 1 − exp(𝜎 )) 
Δ𝐸𝐴~𝐵𝑖𝑛( Δ𝐸 , 1 − exp(−𝑓)) 
Δ𝐴~𝐵𝑖𝑛(𝐴𝑖 , 1 − exp(−𝛾𝐴 − 𝜏𝐴)) 
Δ𝐴𝑅~𝐵𝑖𝑛(Δ𝐴, 1 − exp(− 𝛾𝐴 (𝛾𝐴 + 𝜏𝐴⁄ )) 
Δ𝑃~𝐵𝑖𝑛(𝑃𝑖, 1 − exp(−𝛾𝑃 − 𝜏𝐴)) 
Δ𝑃𝐼~𝐵𝑖𝑛(Δ𝑃 , 1 − exp (−𝛾𝑃 (𝛾𝑃 + 𝜏𝐴⁄ )) 
Δ𝐼~𝐵𝑖𝑛(𝐼𝑖, 1 − exp (−𝛾𝐼 − 𝜏𝐼)) 
Δ𝐼𝑅~𝐵𝑖𝑛(Δ𝐼 , 1 − exp (−𝛾𝐼 (𝛾⁄ 𝐼 + 𝜏𝐼))) 
Δ𝑄𝑅~𝐵𝑖𝑛(𝑄𝑖 , 1 − exp(−𝛾𝑄)) 
 
All state and transition variables are time dependent, although we have dropped (𝑡) for convenience.  
 
The student population was divided into 161 groups representing school and year of study. The 
proportion of students in each group and the mixing between groups was taken from the mixing 
matrix in figure 2. As 92% of the student population is under 30 years of age, we expect a high 
proportion of cases to be asymptomatic19,20 (𝑓 = 0.75). In a survey of university students, a large 
range of symptoms were reported in participants who tested positive for COVID-19, suggesting that 
young adults may have symptoms, but not typical ones21. We also expect a low hospitalisation rate22 
(ℎ = 0.002) and a low mortality rate of hospitalised cases (𝜇 = 0.038)22 and have therefore not 
modelled hospitalisation and death here.  
 
For symptomatic cases, we assume an average incubation period, during which cases are assumed not 
to be infectious and cannot be detected by the test, of 〈1 𝜎⁄ 〉 = 3 days23, after which they become 
infectious but pre-symptomatic for a period of 〈1 𝛾𝑃⁄ 〉 = 2 days, when cases can be detected with a 
test. The infectious period is taken as 〈1 𝛾⁄ 〉 = 3 days23, although there is uncertainty around these 
values. Symptomatic individuals are tested and moved to self-isolation at a rate 𝜏𝐼.  
 
Asymptomatic cases are infectious for 〈1 𝛾𝐴⁄ 〉 = 5 days, so that their average infectious period equals 
the infectious period for symptomatic cases. If asymptomatic cases tested, they are moved to self-
isolation at rate 𝜏𝐴 where they remain for an average of 14 days. Individuals in self-isolation 
contribute to the force-of-infection within their subgroup only at a reduced rate 𝑄 = 0.5.  
 
The infectiousness of asymptomatic cases relative to symptomatic cases is represented by the 
parameter . It is accepted that asymptomatic transmission can and does occur, however its relative 
importance has been difficult to measure due to consistent case definitions, incomplete sampling and 
follow-up24. Apparent asymptomatic transmission is often re-classified as pre-symptomatic 
transmission, i.e. transmission that occurs in the days before symptom onset 24–27. The household 
secondary attack rate for truly asymptomatic index cases has been found to be lower than for 
symptomatic index cases24,27–31. A systematic review of 45 studies found that the secondary attack rate 
for asymptomatic index cases was 60% lower than for symptomatic index cases30. A different analysis 
of serological data from Switzerland found that asymptomatic cases had a 70% lower odds (34% - 
88%) of infecting another household member compared to cases with symptoms31. Another modelling 
study of contact tracing estimated that transmission due to truly asymptomatic cases was limited, with 
pre-symptomatic and symptomatic transmission contributing the remainder in approximately equal 
proportions32.  
 
In summary, it appears that truly asymptomatic cases are less infectious than symptomatic cases. In 
order to capture the reduced infectiousness of asymptomatic cases, while acknowledging that students 
may report non-typical system, we take a baseline value for the relative infectiousness of 
asymptomatic cases, , of 0.5 and also consider a value of 0.3, and the full range of values in the 
supplementary note 4. We assume that pre-symptomatic and symptomatic cases are equally 
infectious33.  
 
We assume the transmission rate between group 𝑖 and group 𝑗, 𝛽𝑖𝑗, is proportional to the contact rate 
𝑐𝑖𝑗, where 𝑐𝑖𝑗 is the average number of contacts in group 𝑗 made by a person in group 𝑖. We assume 
that contacts were either household contacts (ℎ𝑖𝑗), study contacts (𝑠𝑖𝑗) or random contacts (𝑟𝑖𝑗), so 
each entry in the contact matrix is given by  𝑐𝑖𝑗 = ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗. In this formulation, we assume an 
equal probability of transmission by contact type. In order to translate the contact matrix into the 
transmission matrix, we calculate a constant 𝑘 such that the maximum eigenvalue of the transmission 
matrix Β = {𝛽𝑖𝑗} = {𝑘𝑐𝑖𝑗} equals the reproduction number
34. There is an additional background rate 
of infection, governed by the parameter b.  
 
To estimate the reproduction number in the student population, we took a population-wide 
reproduction number of 𝑅0 = 2.7, calculated as follows. In our framework, if a symptomatic case 
generates 𝑅𝑠 secondary cases, then an asymptomatic case will generate 𝑅𝐴 = 𝑅𝑆 secondary cases. 
With 𝑅0 = 𝑅𝑆 + 𝑅𝐴, 𝑅𝑠 = 𝑅0 (𝑓 + (1 − 𝑓) )⁄ . If cases without symptoms are 50% as infectious as 
cases with symptoms ( = 0.5), and a fraction 𝑓 = 0.6 of the general population has symptoms when 
infected, then in a university setting when a lower proportion of cases have symptoms (𝑓 = 0.25) but 
have on average 10% more contacts than an average person, we would expect a reproduction number 
within university of 𝑅𝑈 = 2.7. If = 0.1 then 𝑅𝑈 = 1.7; if = 1 then 𝑅𝑈 = 3.4 (see SI, section 3, 
figure S3).  
 
For the initial conditions, we assumed that 0.2% of incoming students had active asymptomatic or 
pre-symptomatic infections, which we assigned randomly across the year/faculty groups. For each 
scenario, we ran the model 100 times using a different random seed. The model was simulated for one 
year to illustrate the full range of dynamics, and we consider the state of the outbreak after 84 days, 
which is the number of days between the start of the September term and the winter holidays at the 
end of the first term. For numerical results, we report the mean and 98% prediction interval (P.I.) 
from 100 simulations. The model code is available at https://github.com/ellen-is/unimodel 35.  
    
For the main results reported in the paper, we ran the model with baseline parameters for 100 
realisations, drawing from distributions where indicated in table 1 and report the 98% prediction 
interval calculated directly from the 1st and 100th order statistic. To understand the variability further, 
we run 100 further realisations of the model varying all baseline parameters independently by +/-10%, 
and report those results in the Supplementary Information (SI).  
 
The impact of the infectiousness of asymptomatic cases was explored for values of  between 0 
(asymptomatic cases not infectious) and 1 (asymptomatic cases as infectious as symptomatic cases), 
which corresponds to reproduction numbers ranging from 1.7 to 3.4 (see Supplementary Information, 
section 2).     
 
We assumed that symptomatic cases would be tested and self-isolate within 48 hours, which is 
consistent with the median time between symptom onset and test of two days in the UK36. Contact 
tracing is difficult to implement explicitly in the compartmental model framework, but the mechanism 
of action can be captured by a lower within-group transmission rate. We focussed on interventions 
that could be implemented on top of wider control measures and were guided on feasibility by the 
UoB Scientific Advisory Group. We considered the following pragmatic interventions, limited by 
feasibility (see table 2 for a summary): 
• Baseline conditions are “business as usual” behaviour within universities with PHE 
guidelines. Symptomatic cases are tested are moved into self-isolation after an average of 48 
hours if test positive. No additional testing for people with no symptoms. Students are 
assumed to be in living circles that comprise of a maximum of 24 individuals to reflect 
existing UoB arrangements.  
• COVID security represents the reduction in transmission associated with social distancing 
and the use of face coverings37,38. We modelled COVID-security by reducing the transmission 
probability associated with non-household contacts by 25% and 50% to capture the impact of 
face covering use and social distancing outside of residences.   
• Reduced face-to-face teaching is captured by reducing the number of face-to-face teaching 
contacts by 25% and 75% from 20 students to 15 and then 5 students.  
• Reduced living circles reflects reducing the number of students sharing facilities within 
accommodation. In the baseline scenario, we assumed that students were in contact with other 
students living in the same accommodation, forming household groups up to a maximum of 
24 individuals. For accommodation with more than 24 residents, we divided the 
accommodation population up into subunit “living circles” of 24 students. To explore the 
impact of living circle size, we reduced the maximum living circle size from 24 to 20 and 
then 14 persons.    
• Reactive mass testing: We simulate scenarios in which all students are tested for the 
presence of current infection if the number of test-positive cases in a given week is greater 
than the previous week. If mass testing is triggered in the model, all students are tested within 
a given number of days, which is varied between 2 and 7 days. Additional testing is continued 
until the number of test-positive cases in a given week is less than the previous week.  
• Multiple, layered interventions: We investigated the impact of each of the above 
interventions in isolation and then applied sequentially: 25% reduction in transmission due to 
COVID security, followed by a reduction in face-to-face teaching to 10 study contacts, 
followed by a reduction in living circles to 24 individuals, and reactive mass testing every 2 
days if the infection rate on campus should rise, and finally a reduction in importation rates 
from outside the university population.  
 
For each model realisation we calculated a) the doubling time during the exponential growth phase as 
ln(2) 𝑟⁄ , where 𝑟 is the exponential growth rate in the number of infected individuals, b) the incident 
number of symptomatic and asymptomatic cases at the end of the first term (day 84 of the model), c) 
the time the outbreak turns over, d) the number of students in self-isolation and e) the ratio of 
asymptomatic to symptomatic cases.  
 
We ranked the interventions when implemented without additional measures by mean number of 
symptomatic cases at the end of the first term calculated from 100 realisations of the model for a 
given set of parameters and repeated this ranking for values of  between 0 (asymptomatic cases not 
infectious) and 1 (asymptomatic cases as infectious as symptomatic cases).     
 
Data availability 
The Social Contact Survey data used in this study are available at http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/54273/). 
The raw UoB student data are protected and are not available due to data privacy laws. The 
aggregated UoB student contact matrices are available to download at https://github.com/ellen-
is/unimodel/ 35.  
 
Code availability 
The model was coded using R version 4.0.02 (2020-06-22). Model code for reproducing epidemic 
trajectories and other outputs is available at https://github.com/ellen-is/unimodel/ 35. 
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Figure 1: Student mixing matrices based on shared accommodation. The average number of students 
in each school sharing accommodation in (a) year 1; (b) year 2; (c) year 3; (d) for all years and 
schools. The years are six undergraduate years: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and two postgraduate groups R 
(research) and T (taught). The columns are ordered by total number of accommodation contacts. Data 
relate to the University of Bristol for the 2019/20 academic year.  
 
Figure 2: Model schematic. a) Model flow diagram with infection states and rates between them for 
the stochastic meta-population model. The compartments are S: susceptible to infection, E: exposed, 
or infected but pre-infectious, P: pre-symptomatic and infectious, I: symptomatic and infectious, A: 
asymptomatic and infectious, Q: in quarantine, R: recovered and immune. The subscript 𝑖 refers to the 
subgroup. An explanation of the rates is given in the main text, equations 1 and 2 and table 1. 
 
Figure 3: Epidemic trajectories from the stochastic model. a) Epidemic trajectories for the total 
number of infected cases (symptomatic and asymptomatic cases) the baseline model from 100 
realisations with best estimate parameters; b) Mean number of symptomatic cases by year group from 
100 realisations; c) Epidemic trajectories when COVID security (CS) measures reduce transmission 
by 50% and 25%. Undergraduate years 1, 2, 3 and 4, taught postgraduates (PGT) and research 
postgraduates (PGR) are shown; d) Epidemic trajectories when face-to-face teaching (f2f) is limited 
to 15 and 5 persons; e) Epidemic trajectories for reduced living circles to 20 and 14 persons; f) 
Epidemic trajectories when reactive mass testing is implemented every week and every 2 days. Dotted 
vertical lines denote the end of the first term. g) Ranking of interventions by mean number of 
symptomatic cases at the end of the first term from 100 realisations for increasing values of 
asymptomatic infectiousness, and therefore also increasing values of the reproduction number. The 
colours correspond to the colours of the epidemic trajectories above.     
 
Figure 4: The impact of implementing layering interventions. The intervention indicated in the legend 
is implemented in addition to the interventions above. a) Number of symptomatic cases; b) Number of 
infected (symptomatic (left bar) and asymptomatic (right bar)) students at the end of the first term 
(day 84). The height of the bar indicates the mean from 100 model replicates and the points show the 
individual model replicates; c) Number of students that are self-isolating. The interventions 
considered are 25% COVID security (a 25% reduction in per contact transmission), limiting face-to-
face (f2f) teaching to 10 persons, limiting living circles to 14 persons, mass asymptomatic testing 
every 2 days and limiting transmission from outside the university. 
 
Tables 
Table 1: Baseline model parameter values, meaning and sources.  
Parameter Symbol Value/Range References 
Number of household contacts between 
subgroups 
ℎ𝑖𝑗 Estimated from 
accommodation data 
 
Number of study contacts between subgroups 𝑠𝑖𝑗 20.0 (SD: 4.0) 
3,17 
Number of university-wide contacts between 
subgroups 
𝑟𝑖𝑗 4.3 (SD: 1.0) 
3,17 
Basic Reproduction number in the UK 𝑅0 2.7 
18,39 
Transmission probability per contact per day 𝛽 Estimated from 
reproduction number 
 
Proportion of cases with no symptoms 𝑓 0.75 19,20 
Average infectious period 1 𝛾⁄  3 days 23,36 
Average incubation period 1 𝜎⁄  3 days 23,36 
Average pre-symptomatic period 1 𝛾𝑃⁄  2 days 
23,36 
Average infectious period for asymptomatic 
case 
1 𝛾𝐴⁄  1 𝛾𝑃 + ⁄ 1 𝛾⁄   
Average time to test for symptomatic cases 1 𝜏𝐼⁄  2 days 
36 
Average time to test for asymptomatic cases 1 𝜏𝐴⁄  Asymptomatic cases 
not tested in baseline 
model 
 
Length of time in self-isolation 1 𝛾𝑄⁄  14 days  
Relative infectiousness of asymptomatic cases 
compared to symptomatic cases 
 0.5 (0.3 – 0.7) 24,27–31 
Reduction in infectiousness whilst in self 
isolation 
 𝑄 0.5 Assumption 
Background rate of infection 𝑏 - Assumption 
 
























Baseline 0.05§ 4* 20* 24 50% / 100%  None 
COVID 
security 
0.05§ / 0.04 or 
0.025 

















0.05§/ 0.05§ 4* 20* 24 50% / 100%  Every 2 or 7 
days when rates 
are increasing 
Multiple 0.05§ / 0.04 4* 5 14 50% / 100% Every 2 days 
when rates are 
increasing 
*Estimated from the Social Contact Survey, §calculated such that R=2.7.  
 
 
